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Abstract—With the advent of cloud technologies, there is a
growing number of easy-to-use services to store files and share
them with other cloud users. By providing security features,
cloud service providers try to encourage users to store personal
files or corporate documents on their servers. However, their
server-side encryption solutions are not satisfactory when the
server itself is not trusted. Although, there are several client-
side solutions to provide security for cloud sharing, they are not
used extensively because of usability issues in key management.
In this paper, we propose TwinCloud which is an innova-
tive solution with the goal of providing a secure system to
users without compromising the usability of cloud sharing.
TwinCloud achieves this by bringing a novel solution to the
complex key exchange problem and by providing a simple
and practical approach to store and share files by hiding all
the cryptographic and key-distribution operations from users.
Serving as a gateway, TwinCloud uses two or more cloud
providers to store the encryption keys and encrypted files
in separate clouds which ease the secure sharing without a
need for trust to either of the cloud service providers with
the assumption that they do not collude with each other. We
implemented TwinCloud as a lightweight application and make
it available as open-source. The results of our usability study
show the prospect of the secure sharing solution of TwinCloud.
Keywords-cloud security; cloud storage; file sharing; key
management
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is a data storage model in which the data
is stored in multiple remote servers and locations owned by
a hosting company like Dropbox, iCloud or Google Drive.
These cloud providers must keep the data accessible as well
as confidential from other users. They offer services like easy
file storage, sharing, syncing and collaboration among cloud
users. Because of these useful services, today, both regular
consumers and business organizations are widely using the
cloud storage.
However, while cloud storage services provide these use-
ful services, more and more personal and confidential data
is being exposed to privacy and security vulnerabilities.
iCloud, for instance, was hacked by attackers using phish-
ing and brute-force tactics leading to the subsequent posting
of private celebrities photos online [1]. Also, in June 2011,
several Dropbox cloud users were able to access personal
files of other users without authorization due to a bug in the
authentication mechanism [2].
Cloud providers have developed new security methods to
protect users data from attackers. For example, Dropbox and
iCloud started to use two-step verification where the idea is
to combine something you know (password) with something
you have (phone) to add an extra layer of security [3], and
also Dropbox uses Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to protect data in transit between
client apps and Dropbox servers [4]. Moreover, Google
Drive stores the data randomly distributed across multiple
machines which provide another security level [6].
However, these security mechanisms are not sufficient
and only protect users from third party unauthorized access,
not from the cloud storage providers access to confidential
files. Google states in its Terms of Service that when you
upload or submit a file, you give Google a license to use,
modify, publish and distribute the content of the file [5].
Furthermore, Google analyzes the file content and uses for
advertising. Dropbox has also a similar term of service for
the files that you put in their storage. Moreover, according to
Snowdens documents [19], NSA has a secret program called
Prism which the agency collects sensitive data from Google,
Facebook, Apple, Yahoo and other US Internet giants.
In order to protect the customers data stored in the cloud,
two models are used among cloud service providers and
third party cloud applications:
1) Server-side encryption: Data is encrypted after upload-
ing to the cloud.
2) Client-side encryption: Data is encrypted before up-
loading to the cloud.
For server-side encryption, Dropbox uses 256-bit Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt uploaded files
before writing to the disk [4]. Google Drive also uses 256-bit
AES, and each encryption key is itself encrypted with a reg-
ularly rotated set of master keys [7]. These security measures
protect the data from attackers, but cloud providers have the
encryption key and the files get decrypted on their servers
every time they are accessed. Moreover, their administrators
can see users files, and so can anyone who manages to gain
access to their systems. For instance, in 2010, a Google
employee accessed several Gmail and Hangouts accounts to
spy and harass people [8]. Thus, server-side encryption is
not sufficient itself for security and need to be supported by
other security measures like client side encryption.
Client-side encryption will eliminate the above problem
since files are encrypted before uploading to remote cloud
servers with an encryption key that only a specific user
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knows. There are several commercial cloud encryption pro-
grams such as nCrypted, Sookasa, Tresorit and BoxCryptor
which provide client-side encryption. However, this method
reduces the usability of cloud services. With client-side
encryption, users could not share their files as easily as
before because they also need to share the encryption key
with other users from a secure channel. In order to solve
the key distribution problem, several PKI-based methods
were proposed [10], [11], [13], [15]. However, PKI-based
solutions have some drawbacks. They are costly because
they need to get a certificate from a CA. On the overall, it
is well-documented that managing cryptographic keys is not
manageable for average computer users [26].
There are several methods used by cloud providers to
share files. File owners can use one of the following sharing
methods to share their files with business partners, friends
and coworkers [9]:
1) Public sharing: File is shared with a public URL that
everyone can access.
2) Secret-URL sharing: File is shared by sending a pri-
vate sharing URL to specific users.
3) Private sharing: File owner must specify who can
access the shared file and cloud service provider
authenticates the specified users while accessing the
file.
Both Dropbox and Google Drive supports all of these
sharing methods (however as of this writing private and
public sharing is only applicable for folders, not for files
on Dropbox).
The sharing methods listed above are used only for
sharing the original file and are not yet used for key sharing.
Thus, after encryption, using cloud providers services, it is
only possible to share the encrypted file. Encryption key
needs to be shared from another channel. Finding a secure
channel to share the key is a problem with serious usability
challenges.
In this paper, we present a novel solution, TwinCloud,
that uses client-side encryption and private sharing method.
Cloud users could continue to use the cloud services as
before in a simple way. Users are able to share their files
securely using the TwinCloud application which maintains
the encrypted file and the encryption key in separate clouds
where users can do all file operations from this single
application without a need for explicit key management.
TwinCloud generates a key and encrypts the file with
this key before storing in cloud servers. Then, it uploads
the encryption key to a cloud and encrypted file to another
cloud. Users easily share a file to a specific user by using the
TwinCloud’s user interface while TwinCloud, in the back-
end, shares the encryption key and the encrypted file to the
specific user using cloud providers’ file sharing features.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses the related work. Section III describes our solution
and the properties of TwinCloud. Section IV provides a
comparison of our solution to other solutions. Section V
presents the results of our usability study of TwinCloud.
Section VI discusses several extensions and provides ideas
for future work. And finally, Section VII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section examines preceding academic and industrial
work related to secure file sharing on clouds. Zhao et al.
[12] proposed a trusted data sharing method over untrusted
cloud storage providers. This method can be described as
follows:
1) Alice encrypts her data and keeps the data on a cloud
storage.
2) Bob sends a request to Alice asking for access per-
mission to the data.
3) Alice sends a credential to the cloud storage provider
for the re-encryption of the data and sends a credential
for Bob to decrypt the re-encrypted data with his
private key.
4) When Bob acquires the re-encrypted data from the
cloud storage provider, he decrypts it.
The credentials are sent using Public Key Cryptography
(PKC).
Jivanyan et.al [20] proposed a proxy re-encryption scheme
for secure file sharing without certificates. The solution uses
PKC but does not use a PKI. In this solution, Alice shares
the encrypted file with Bob as follows:
1) Alice generates a proxy key for Bob and gives the key
to the proxy server.
2) Alice creates a permission object to indicate the file
is allowed to be viewed by Bob.
3) Bob extracts the encrypted key file from the beginning
of the file. The file key is encrypted via Alices public
key.
4) Bob sends the encrypted key file to the proxy server
and asks to be re-encrypted.
5) Proxy server checks whether Bob was given permis-
sion for the file. If he has the permission, the proxy
server re-encrypt the key file with proxy-key given by
Alice. The new encrypted key file sent back to Bob.
6) Bob decrypts the re-encrypted key file with his private
key. The content of the file can be decrypted with the
decrypted key file.
When Alice needs to share her files with many users, she just
creates corresponding proxy-keys and the permission objects
indicating which user can access the given file. There is no
need to encrypt the file encryption key with all users public
keys which is one of the advantages of this system.
Yin et.al [11] proposed another efficient secure data stor-
age scheme using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based
PKI. Before using this solution, users need to authenticate
to a Certificate Authority (CA) and register for a certificate.
When users want to share a file with other authenticated
users, the user first encrypts the data with his symmetric
key and encrypts the symmetric key with the private key of
his/her registered certificate. After the encryption process,
authenticated users can obtain the public key and decrypt the
encrypted key to get the symmetric key. The symmetric key,
then, will be used to decrypt the file. The main advantage of
this solution is the efficiency of preferring ECC over other
algorithms like RSA. Because of the small key length, this
solution requires less computation and communication cost.
Boxcryptor [13] is a widely used commercial tool to
protect files in the cloud and it supports many cloud ser-
vice providers such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft
OneDrive and Box. It uses AES with a key length of 256
bits, CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), PKCS7 padding and
RSA with a key length of 4096 bits and OAEP padding.
Boxcryptor uses following steps to share file between Alice
and Bob [14]:
1) Alice requests Bob’s public key from the Boxcryptor
Key Server.
2) Alice encrypts the file key with Bob’s public key.
3) Alice writes the new encrypted key file.
4) The cloud storage provider syncs the modified en-
crypted key file.
5) Bob uses his private key to decrypt the file key.
6) Bob uses the file key to decrypt the file.
Boxcryptor also uses a trusted CA.
Tresorit [15] is a cloud provider that uses client-side
encryption. They use PKI and PKC to share the encryption
key. Tresorit does not fully trust any other certificate issuer,
thus certificates issued by Tresorit company itself with the
Tresorit User CA certificate. Users can share files by creating
Tresor (a shareable secure online folder) that contains the
files they want to share or by creating and sending encrypted
links to other users.
There are several other sharing methods used with client-
side encryption and nearly all of these methods [10], [21],
[22] use PKC or PKI-based solutions. However, there are
some disadvantages of these solutions in terms of usabil-
ity and security. Managing a trusted PKI is costly and
hard to maintain. It also burdens the users with handling
cryptographic operations. Moreover, if an attacker manages
to obtain the private key of a CA certificate, the attacker
can see all the files and its contents. In above cases, the
attacker could potentially be someone from the cloud service
providers. The fact that the certificates were issued by cloud
providers verifies that they also can view user data whenever
the keys are used for encryption/decryption purposes [16].
By realizing this, we design TwinCloud that does not
require a trusted third party like a CA and does not use a PKI
structure or PKC. It uses only symmetric key cryptography.
It also does not require users to handle key management.
III. SOLUTION
A. Solution in a Nutshell
TwinCloud is a lightweight application that uses client-
side encryption and private sharing (see section I).
Our solution requires at least two cloud service providers.
These cloud providers must provide simple file operations
such as uploading, downloading a file and private file
sharing. We use one of the cloud service providers in
order to store the encrypted file and the other one to store
the encryption key. This ensures that both cloud providers
cannot see the file content by themselves. We assume that
two cloud providers do not collide to bring encrypted file and
the key together to decrypt the file. Against such a threat, the
solution could be extended to using more than two clouds.
Alternatively, encryption keys could be stored in a private,
internal cloud. Companies can use their enterprise clouds
(which does not need to have a high storage capacity) to
store keys and a cloud service provider to store encrypted
files.
For file sharing, the application shares the encrypted file
and the encryption key to the specified specific user simply
by using cloud providers file sharing features. With this way,
only the specific user can access the encrypted file and the
encryption key, and can use them to decrypt the shared file.
The solution does not require a complex PKC based key
exchange protocol.
Authentication of users is managed by cloud service
providers which eliminate the need for a PKI structure or
an additional server to store user information. However, a
custom designed authentication method of TwinCloud can
be applied.
Our solution does not store user accounts and related key
paths to encrypted files on the client side. User accounts are
managed by cloud service providers. Key files and encrypted
files are uploaded with names that can be matched in order
to reach them easily after uploading.
TwinCloud uses symmetric key cryptography for file
encryption. The encrypted files are stored in the cloud
storage. It deletes the key files and the encrypted files from
the local computers temporary folder after uploading and
downloading operations are completed.
The basic explanation of uploading a file is illustrated in
Fig. 1.
In summary, TwinCloud provides a single user account
and a uniform user experience to execute all file operations.
In the backend, the application manages two different ac-
counts from two separate cloud service providers. While
users are uploading their files through the application, files
are not stored by our application, rather stored in external
cloud drives.
B. Solution Details
In our solution, we choose two cloud service provider;
Dropbox and Google Drive as they are preferred the most
Figure 1. Uploading a file to cloud using TwinCloud.
among cloud users. Moreover, their application program in-
terfaces (APIs) are easy to understand and highly functional.
TwinCloud uses Google Drive to store the encrypted file
and Dropbox to store the encryption key. We use Java
programming language for implementation. Dropbox API
and Google Drive API are used for cloud file operations.
Our application uses 256 bit AES with CBC and PKCS7
padding. Encryption keys are randomly generated by Java
Key Generator utility. For authentication and authorization,
we use OAuth2.0 [17] protocol. Sign up and login operations
to Google Drive and Dropbox are also controlled by the
application.
There are seven main operations implemented in our
application; sign up, login, upload a file, download a file,
delete a file, share a file and unshare a file.
Sign up: TwinCloud uses a user interface similar to
Googles Sign Up interface for Sign up. When a user enters a
username and password, application derives two passwords
from the original password. This derivation is achieved by
calculating two different hashes. We use Hash(Password
—— Username —— URL) function to derive the pass-
words. When generating the Dropbox password, the URL
field is concatenated with Dropbox URL and Google URL
is used to generate the Google Drive password. The resulting
hashes, then, processed to fit in the providers password
fields. TwinCloud uses the username and the first password
to create a Google Account and uses the second password
to create a Dropbox account with the same username.
Thus, if an attacker obtains one of the passwords, since
the other password cannot be obtained without knowing the
original password, it will not be possible to authenticate in
both clouds and decrypt the file. Furthermore, this prevents
a plausible attack when an authentication bug occurs, as
occurred before in Dropbox [2], in one of the cloud service
providers. Hence, we think that this adds another level of
security to our cloud solution.
Selenium, a tool for automating web applications [18], is
used for creating Google and Dropbox accounts.
Login: Users login to the system using their usernames
and passwords. TwinCloud again derives the Dropbox and
Google passwords to login to cloud service providers. After
logging in, the user is asked whether they are willing to grant
the permissions that the application is requesting. These
permissions are required by Google Drive and Dropbox
in order to do the necessary file operations. OAuth 2.0
authentication flow is used for obtaining the access token.
Figure 2. Detailed login flow in TwinCloud.
Fig. 2 shows the authentication flow. First, user logs in to
the TwinCloud by entering his/her username and password
(1). TwinCloud, in the backend, performs the login to Drop-
box and Google Drive by following these steps: TwinCloud
requests an access token from Google Drive and Dropbox
separately (2). Dropbox and Google Drive request an authen-
tication. This authentication is performed by the application
(3) and the program automatically grants the access (4).
Dropbox and Google Drive returns an authorization code (5)
which will be used to get the access token. TwinCloud uses
the authorization code to exchange the access tokens (6).
Finally, Dropbox and Google Drive returns the access tokens
(7). The application saves the access tokens in order not to
repeat these steps in every login. Authentication and Grant
Access operations are also implemented using Selenium.
Similar to other cloud applications such as Dropbox and
Google, if a user has already an account on TwinCloud
and opens the program for the first time, the application
automatically starts to download the stored files into the local
computer and decrypts them.
Upload file: Files can be uploaded to the cloud using
simple drag-and-drop operations. TwinCloud executes the
following steps while uploading a file named hello.txt:
1) Generate the file encryption key (k).
2) Encrypt the file with key k.
3) Save the encryption key to a file named hello.txt.key
to the temporary folder.
4) Save the encrypted file as hello.txt to the temporary
folder.
5) Create a folder named hello.txt keyFolder in Dropbox.
(Since Dropbox does not support private sharing over
files, application creates a folder with the same name
and uploads the key file into the folder for future file
sharing operations.)
6) Upload hello.txt.key file to
hello.txt keyFolder/hello.txt.key in Dropbox.
7) Upload encrypted hello.txt file to /hello.txt in Google
Drive.
8) Delete hello.txt.key from the temp folder.
9) Delete encrypted hello.txt file from the temp folder.
Download file: Selected files can be downloaded using
their filenames. TwinCloud executes the following steps
while downloading a file named hello.txt:
1) Download the key file from Dropbox with the
hello.txt keyFolder/hello.txt.key path to the temp
folder.
2) Download the encrypted file from Google Drive to the
temp folder.
3) Decrypt the encrypted file (hello.txt) with the key file
(hello.txt.key) and save to the local computer.
4) Delete hello.txt.key from the temp folder.
5) Delete encrypted hello.txt file from the temp folder.
Delete file: Selected files can be deleted from cloud storage
using their filenames. TwinCloud executes the following
steps while deleting a file named hello.txt:
1) Delete the key folder from Dropbox with the
/hello.txt keyFolder path. The folder also deleted from
cloud service providers trash.
2) Delete the encrypted file hello.txt from Google Drive.
The file is also deleted from cloud service providers
trash.
Share file: Selected files can be shared with specific users.
TwinCloud executes the following steps for sharing a file
named hello.txt with the user Bob:
1) Share folder /hello.txt keyFolder/ in Dropbox with the
user Bob using Dropbox API.
2) Share file hello.txt in Google Drive with the user Bob
using Google Drive API.
After this operation, when Bob list its files, he will directly
see the file hello.txt in its file list because Google Drive API
shows the shared files along the uploaded files when listing Figure 3. Visualization of the upload, share and download operations in
TwinCloud.
Figure 4. TwinCloud start-bar menu.
all files. Users can also select specific permissions while
sharing files such as; can edit and can read. Moreover, files
can be shared more than one person.
Unshare file: After sharing a file, the user can revoke this
permission. TwinCloud executes the following steps while
unsharing a file named hello.txt from the user Bob:
1) Remove Bobs permission to access folder
/hello.txt keyFolder/ in Dropbox using Dropbox
API.
2) Remove Bobs permission to access file hello.txt in
Google Drive using Google Drive API.
Fig. 3 shows the upload, share and download operations.
After login, Alice uploads a file to the TwinCloud (I). The
application generates a key (II) and encrypts the file (III).
Then, these files are uploaded to Google Drive and Dropbox
using APIs as seen in (IV) and (V). After successfully
uploading the file, Alice shares the file with Bob using
Dropbox API (VI) and Google Drive API (VII). This will
allow Bob to see the shared file from its application. Bob
requests to download the file from the application. Our
application downloads the encryption key from Dropbox
(VIII) and encrypted text from Google Drive (IX). After
completing the downloads, the application decrypts the file
(X). From now, Bob can also see the content of the shared
file.
We implemented TwinCloud in Java. Users can operate
TwinCloud from a start-bar menu as shown in Fig. 4 and
share their files from the application as shown in Fig. 5.
TwinCloud is an open source application and can be found
on Github [24].
IV. COMPARISON
Table. I provides a comparison of TwinCloud and other
solutions.
PKI-Based solutions use PKC and need a trusted third
party e.g., CA. The key management is complex as discussed
Figure 5. TwinClouds share window.
before. For easy key recovery and file recovery, this solution
needs to store backups of these files whereas in our system it
is ensured by the cloud providers. Private sharing and secret
URL sharing (see Section I) could be supplied by PKI-based
solutions. Also, the integrity of files is protected. Traditional
Client-side Encryption uses only symmetric key encryption.
Users, before uploading their files to the cloud, encrypt files
using third-party encryption programs. Thus, this does not
require a trust to the cloud service provider. This method
requires users to manage their own keys for file operations
and sharing. Therefore key management is again complex.
Users need to store replicas of the encryption key and the
encrypted file for file recovery. Private sharing and Secret-
URL sharing are not directly supported because of the key
exchange issues. Moreover, users need to use other programs
to protect integrity.
Server-side encryption is provided by cloud providers.
Files are encrypted while uploading to the cloud. Cloud
providers can easily access to users’ files. It requires a full
trust to the cloud service provider. Encryption keys and
encrypted files are stored replicated for easy recovery. They
support private sharing and secret-URL sharing. Integrity
check is performed by the cloud provider.
In PKI-Based systems security of the system depends on
CA and cloud provider. In traditional client-side encryption,
it depends on key sharing channel and encryption program.
For server-side encryption, security requires a trust to cloud
provider.
V. USABILITY OF TWINCLOUD
Through a user study, we evaluated the usability of the
TwinCloud and compared it with Tresorit [15]. We report
the results in this section.
Tresorit is an end-to-end encrypted cloud storage. Users
can share their files using encrypted links with an additional
TwinCloud PKI-Based Traditional Client-Side Encryption Server-Side Encryption
Requires a trust to the cloud service provider 7 7 7 3
Requires a trusted 3rd party 7 3 7 7
Public key cryptography 7 3 7 7
Symmetric key cryptography 3 7 7 3
Easy key management and key exchange 3 7 7 7
Private sharing 3 3 7 3
Secret-URL sharing 3 3 7 3
Integrity check 3 3 7 3
Table I
COMPARISON OF TWINCLOUD TO OTHER SOLUTIONS.
password protection option. They can also set expiration
date and limit the number of downloads. Since it has the
encrypted link option for sharing and a simple user interface
we chose Tresorit to compare with TwinCloud.
Encrypted links contain fragment identifiers. When an
encrypted link is opened, the web browser requests the
encrypted data from Tresorit servers and sends the URL
(without the fragment) to the server. As the fragment itself
will not be sent, the server cannot access the data sent, but
the browser, by combining the encrypted file and the key
contained in the fragment, is able to decrypt it [25].
The security of the sharing mostly relies on the security
of the channel where users send the encrypted link (in most
cases this channel is e-mail). In a broad sense, TwinCloud
and Tresorit offer the same level of security. While, the
later assumes that Tresorit and email service provider do
not collude, the former makes the same assumption for the
two cloud service providers.
E-mail servers of Google or Microsoft scan and parse
the mail links to detect online scam and fraudulent links.
However, this can lead to the leakage of information where
government agencies can request to collect and access to
users encrypted files [25]. In case the URL is exposed,
shared files lose their protection. Moreover, a malicious
browser extension can expose the encrypted link. These
kinds of attacks cannot be applied to our solution because we
do not have an encrypted link option. The optional password
protection feature will add more security to sharing if users
choose to transmit the password from another channel and
use strong passwords.
In our usability study, we asked users to use the encrypted
link option with password protection in Tresorit and send the
link by e-mail.
A. Hypotheses
Our expectations before the study were that users will
find TwinCloud easier to use since it does not require to use
an e-mail service to share a file. Moreover, we thought that
the time spent to share a file will be less for TwinCloud.
We also expected that users will find the Tresorit more
secure as it has an additional password protection (One
disadvantage of TwinCloud is that since its provided security
is not directly observed by the users, they may find other
methods with explicit security features more secure). We
specify our hypotheses for this study as follows:
H1 Users would find TwinCloud more usable than Tresorit.
H2 Sharing time of TwinCloud will be smaller than the
sharing time of Tresorit.
H3 Users would find Tresorit more secure.
B. Methodology
For our study we contacted 20 people that have not
used Tresorit and TwinCloud before. We provided them the
computer that has TwinCloud and Tresorit installed. We gave
each user a scenario and tasks. We used System Usability
Scale (SUS) [23] to evaluate the usability of the programs.
A session starts with demographic questions, and contin-
ues with a scenario. Then, we gave users the tasks and the
subtasks. After each task we asked the ten questions from
SUS.
Each task consists of two subtasks. First subtask asks
users to share a file with a specific user and the second
subtask asks users to open a file which is shared with them.
For the tasks we gave them a start point such as the path of
the file they need to share. Different from TwinCloud tasks,
for Tresorit we asked users to specify the way they choose
to transmit the password (Phone call, SMS, WhatsApp, E-
mail, other). Fig. 6 demonstrate the proportion of channels
users choose to transmit the passwords. (Majority of users
preferred Email. When the password is shared through email,
then combining encrypted link with the password protection
offers no more security over encrypted link option alone.)
At the end of the session we asked users to sort the systems
by their usability in sharing and security.
C. Results and analysis
There were 20 users aged between 16 and 49 participated
in this study. Among participants, 6 of them (30%) were
female. 11 users (55%) were satisfied with their current skills
for using Cloud Storage technologies.
We first present the results in cumulative form for Twin-
Cloud and Tresorit in Fig 7, 8 and 9. Fig. 7 shows the total
time for sharing a file and opening a file shared with users.
Figure 6. Proportion of channels users choose to transmit passwords.
Fig. 8 compares the SUS scores of TwinCloud and Tresorit.
Figure 7. Sharing times of TwinCloud and Tresorit.
Figure 8. Mean of SUS scores in percentage.
At the end of the session we asked users to choose the
one that is more usable in sharing and the one that is more
secure. Fig. 9 demonstrates the results. 72.7% of users found
TwinCloud more usable in sharing and 58% of users found
Tresorit more secure.
Figure 9. Proportion of users who votes on TwinCloud and Tresorit in
terms of usability and security.
We used non-parametric tests in our analysis; the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for time comparison (H2), t-test
for usability comparison (H1). A p-value less than 0.05 is
considered as an evidence to reject the null-hypothesis.
According to Wilcoxon signed-rant test, the difference be-
tween sharing time of TwinCloud and Tresorit is significant
(p = 0.022). This supports H2.
The average SUS score of TwinCloud is 77.20% and for
Tresorit it is 68.67%. Also, 72.7% of users found TwinCloud
more usable. This could be a supporting argument for
our hypothesis (H1). However, according to the T-Test,
the difference between the SUS scores of TwinCloud and
Tresorit is marginally significant (p = 0.056). We think that
this is because TwinCloud user interface does not look as
professional as Tresorit. Also, during some of the sessions
TwinCloud is slower because of slow internet connection.
These kinds of disturbances might affect our results.
In our methodology users access files that are shared with
them right after we send the encrypted link, so they easily
find the link in their inbox. However in real situations users
more probably spend more time searching the encrypted
link in their inboxes. This may decrease the SUS scores
of Tresorit and lengthen the time spent to open the shared
files.
According to Fig. 8, More than half of the people (58.8%)
found Tresorit more secure because of the additional pass-
word protection mechanism. This supports H3. However,
12 users (60% of total users) used the same e-mail to
transmit the password which we think weakens the security
dramatically. Also, nearly half of the users (45%) chose
weak passwords such as 123.
As a result of our usability study, we can conclude that
our hypotheses are supported (H1 is only weakly supported).
VI. EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
To hide the real file names from cloud providers, we
encrypt the file names while uploading to Google Drive and
Dropbox. To do this, TwinCloud generates two encryption
keys. We store the first one in Google Drive and use to
encrypt the file names on Dropbox. The second key is stored
in Dropbox and used to encrypt the file names on Google
Drive. Moreover, to protect the integrity of a file, TwinCloud
computes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the
original file and uploads the result to Dropbox. The key
used to calculate the MAC is stored in Google Drive.
For future work, for information-theoretical level of secu-
rity instead of AES, One-time pads can be used to encrypt
the files. We note that long key sizes are less of a problem
and they can be easily stored in the cloud and shared with
other users using our solution. Furthermore, our solution
can easily be adapted to more than two cloud providers.
For instance, two of the three cloud providers can be used
to store the encryption key and the other one can be used
to store the encrypted file where both keys are needed to
decrypt the file.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced TwinCloud to provide an
easy-to-use cloud experience for cloud users who are also
sensitive to the security of files they upload. We described a
novel approach that uses two or more cloud service providers
to securely store and share files without complex key man-
agement operations. TwinCloud provides security by using
one cloud provider to store the encrypted file and the other
one to store the encryption key. It executes all the necessary
file operation in the back-end and does not ask cloud users
for complex key distribution operations. Since, TwinCloud
creates all the cryptographic files on-the-fly and does not
need to store encryption keys, encrypted files and user in-
formation, it is a lightweight solution. TwinCloud’s usability
and perceived security were evaluated and compared with
Tresorit by a usability study. We concluded that TwinCloud
is more usable for sharing, however, users think that it is
less secure than Tresorit’s password-protected encrypted link
share method. TwinCloud is an easily applicable security
solution in scenarios where it is assumed that cloud providers
do not collude with each other.
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